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History of Virtualization – When virtualization was first conceived in 1960s, it was known to programmers 
and researchers as time sharing. It was Christopher Strachey, Professor of Computation at Oxford University 
who coined the term in his paper “Time Sharing in Large Fast Computers” wherein he was referring to what 
he called multi-programming. According to this technique, while one programmer is developing a program 
on his console and another programmer debugging his, there would be no usual wait for peripherals. Multi-
programming and similar ideas began to drive innovation which has resulted in several computers that have 
been brought to existence like the Atlas and IBM's M44/44X.  
Atlas computer was one of the first supercomputers of the early 1960s that used concepts such as time 
sharing, multi-programming, as well as shared peripheral control. Atlas was one of the fastest computers of 
its time partially due to a separation of OS processes from the executing user programs. The component 
called the supervisor managed the computer's processing time, and was passed extracodes, thus helping in 
the management of the user program's instructions. This was considered as the birth of the hypervisor or 
virtual machine monitor (VMM). 
IBM spearheaded the M44/44X Project at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center. The architecture 
which was similar to that of Atlas computer led to coining of the term virtual machines. The IBM 7044 
(M44) scientific computer was supported by several simulated 7044 virtual machines, using hardware and 
software, virtual memory, and multi-programming. 
What is Virtualization? - Virtualization means to create a virtual version of a device or resource, such as a 
server, storage device, network or even an operating system where the framework divides the resource into 
one or more execution environments. In other words, virtualization is a framework or methodology of 
dividing the resources of a computer into multiple execution environments, by applying one or more 
concepts or technologies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-sharing, partial or complete 






Figure 1. Simple representation of virtualize system 
Why is Virtualization important? - Live migration has many advantages. It gives the user flexibility and 
options to take down a working server during the day, rather than at night or on weekends, upgrade the 
operating system, apply patches, etc., then bring it back up again during regular working hours. This is a 
very useful concept, for instance, operations managers in data centers look at where they have heavy 
workloads and move virtual machines around so that the cooling system isn't working excessively hard 
trying to keep just part of the data center at the right temperature. 
Following are some representative reasons for and benefits of virtualization: 
• Virtual machines can be used to consolidate the workloads of several underutilized servers to fewer 
machines, perhaps a single machine (server consolidation). 
• Related benefits are savings on hardware, environmental costs, management, and administration of 
the server infrastructure. 
• The need to run legacy applications is served well by virtual machines. 
• Virtual machines can be used to provide secure, isolated sandboxes for running non-trusted 




• Virtual machines can be used to create operating systems, or execution environments with resource 
limits, and given the right schedulers, resource guarantees. 
• Virtual machines can provide the illusion of hardware, or hardware configuration that you do not 
have (such as SCSI devices, multiple processors, etc) 
• Virtual machines can be used to run multiple operating systems simultaneously: different versions, or 
even entirely different systems, which can be on hot standby. 
• Virtual machines allow for powerful debugging and performance monitoring. 
• Virtual machines can isolate what they run, so they provide fault and error containment. Virtual 
machines make software easier to migrate, thus aiding application and system mobility. 
• Virtual machines are great tools for research and academic experiments. 
• Virtualization can enable existing operating systems to run on shared memory multiprocessors. 
• Virtual machines can be used to create arbitrary test scenarios, and can lead to some very 
imaginative, effective quality assurance. 
• Virtualization can make tasks such as system migration, backup, and recovery easier and more 
manageable. 
• Virtualization can be an effective means of providing binary compatibility. 
• Virtualization is fun. 
 
Types of Virtual Machines: 
 
1. Process VMs 







   Figure 2. Types of Virtual Machines 
 
Virtual Machine Applications: 
 
1. Emulation – This allows mix and match cross-platform portability. 
2. Optimization – This provides platform-specific performance improvement. It is usually done with 
emulation. 
3. Replication – This allows having multiple virtual machines on a single platform. 





   Figure 3. Virtual Machine Applications 
Performance Goals in Migration: 
 
• Migration of Virtual Machines helps minimize ‘Downtime’. 
• One of the major performance goals in migration is reduction of total migration time of virtual 
machines. 
• It helps if there is no interference with normal system activity which is an important goal of 
migration. 
• To minimize network activity is also a performance goal in migration. 
Business Challenge: 
 
Initially virtualization was embraced as a method to consolidate multiple server applications onto fewer 
servers so as to increase utilization and reduce energy requirements. Today, IT organizations are looking 
beyond just server consolidation. Today virtualization is being used to create more dynamic data centers. 
Live migration dynamically allocates and balances computing resources and thus helps us align the 
infrastructure with enterprise-level business goals. Live migration performs migrations without actually 
interrupting the services the Virtual Machines are providing and thereby reducing the additional work 
usually involved with migrating Virtual Machines. Traditionally, the extra work involves first shutting down 




Machines and the applications that were shutdown. So by eliminating this additional work, live migration 
helps improve flexibility and efficiency in managing data center resources. 
Advanced data centers are benefitted by live migration by use of following capabilities: 
1. Dynamic Load balancing 
2. No VM downtime during maintenance 
Dynamic Load Balancing: 
Dynamic load balancing will change the mapping of jobs to resources at any point, but there may be a cost 
associated with the changes. There are two main types of dynamic load balancing algorithms: preemptive 
and non-preemptive. In a preemptive algorithm, the mapping of jobs to physical resources may change while 
a job is running whereas with the non-preemptive algorithms, once a job has started the physical resources 
assigned to that job cannot change. Dynamic load balancing redistributes tasks during execution which 
typically moves tasks from heavily loaded processors to lightly loaded processors. Also the dynamic load 
balancing algorithm can be centralized or distributed. In centralized scheme, all information is sent to a 
single decision-making agent that decides when load balancing will occur and which tasks will be moved. In 
distributed dynamic load balancing, load information is not shared globally and all processors take part in 
deciding when load-balancing occurs and which tasks will be migrated. One major advantage of dynamic 
load balancing is that the run-time behavior of the system does not need to be known in advance. While 
these algorithms are very good at maximizing utilization of all resources, there is a run time overhead 
associated with gathering information and transferring tasks to different processors. 
No VM downtime during maintenance: 
When enterprise-level servers need maintenance and if they are hardware-based physical servers, they need 
to be shutdown and hence due to this downtime there may be loss of business and/or inconvenience to users 
and clients. But by using live migration, enterprises can perform server maintenance like software upgrades 
without experiencing VM downtime, as the VMs can be moved from the primary host server to secondary 







Live migration of virtual machines (VMs) is the process of transitioning a VM from one virtual machine 
monitor (VMM) to another without halting the guest operating system, often between distinct physical 
machines, has opened new opportunities in computing.  It allows a clean separation between hardware and 
software, and facilitates fault management, load balancing, and low-level system maintenance. Implemented 
by several existing virtualization products, live migration also aids in aspects such as high availability 
services, transparent mobility and consolidated management.  
While virtualization and live migration enable important new functionality, the combination introduces 
novel security challenges. A virtual machine monitor that incorporates a vulnerable implementation of live 
migration functionality may expose both the guest and host operating system to attack and result in a 
compromise of integrity. 
Given the large and increasing market for virtualization technology, a comprehensive understanding of 
virtual machine migration security is essential. So the motivation for my setup is to create a test environment 
that is suitable for this experiment and analyze the security implications in case of exploitation of Live 
Migration of Virtual Machines. 
3. Objective 
 
Applying published dynamic load balancing algorithms to virtual machines and the experimental study of 
security implications by exploiting Live Migration of Virtual Machines, is the central idea of my thesis. 
I am primarily interested in answering these following questions: 
 
• “What is the overhead of load balancing using specified policy engine?” 
• “What happens when Live Migration of Virtual Machines is exploited? “ 
• “What is the effect of these security implications on the various Performance factors on which Live 
Migration depends?” 
• “How does exploiting the security affect migration-enabled dynamic load balancing?” 
• “Can there be effective Resource Isolation in case of security lapse?” 






The scope of my thesis research is essentially to use Live VM migration for dynamic load balancing or 
scheduling. This experimentation will determine workload hotspots in physical environment and through use 
of effective Live Migration process; it will try to carry out resource profiling. By carrying out effective 
profiling, this thesis research will be able to determine how much of each resource needs to be allocated to a 
VM. To understand exactly why process migration would not work in such scenarios and better understand 
Live VM Migration, this thesis will try to provide requisite incites as to which model is most appropriate for 
automatic load balancing for virtual machine infrastructure based on resource consumption. The security 
implications of exploiting the process of migration may end in unexpected results or results that are not 
























Virtual Machine Monitors were developed to better utilize the expensive mainframe hardware and its 
resources so that multiple applications and servers could coexist on the same physical host. The motivation 
for research in this field today is increasing dramatically as more hardware is developed with built in native 
virtualization support and more software solutions appear. 
Reliability and redundancy are key features in modern virtualization technology. Mission critical 
applications do not tolerate downtime and corporations can quickly lose money if their availability is 
affected by maintenance, hardware- or software failure or malicious activity. Virtual machine technology 
deals with this challenge with just simply moving the virtual machine(s) from the physical host that needs 
maintenance onto other server hardware while the virtual machine is running and maintaining service 
availability. With the virtual machines running elsewhere there is no harm in doing a server shutdown in 
order to do maintenance quick and undisturbed. 
A virtual infrastructure can utilize live server migration to move running production servers to other network 
hosts in order to do, for instance scheduled maintenance or replace faulty hardware. This makes the network 
setup very fault-tolerant and eliminates any maintenance or management downtime. There are several ways 
of presenting a virtual hardware layer, and the many Virtual Machine Monitors solve the problems in 
different ways. As stated by Christopher Clark, et al, migrating an entire OS and all of its applications as one 
unit allows us to avoid many of the difficulties faced by process-level migration approaches. In particular 
the narrow interface between a virtualized OS and the virtual machine monitor (VMM) makes it easy avoid 
the problem of ‘residual dependencies’. Live migration of virtual machines allows a separation of concerns 
between the users and operator of a data center or cluster. Christopher Clark, et al, have addressed the 
importance of using live OS migration [1] as a powerful tool for cluster administrators, allowing separation 
of hardware and software considerations, and consolidating clustered hardware into a single coherent 




machine(s), freeing the original machine for maintenance, is central to their implementation of high-
performance migration support for XEN. Their implementation is very significant and suggests an efficient 
way to enable rapid movement of interactive workloads within clusters and data centers. It is also important 
to know that resources do also migrate which may depend on resource to process binding – by identifiers 
like specific website, ftp server; or by type like printers, local devices. Resources can also migrate 
depending on type of attachments – fixed resources like local devices, communication end points; or 
resources moved only at high costs like databases. This current research has helped understand the 
implementation by Clark, et al by furthering the research with support of Resource Allocation but using 
VMWare technology which is vMotion. 
The practice of dedicating one server to each service or application is costly and precious IT-resources are 
stretched thin procuring, provisioning and maintaining a growing number of under-utilized servers. Business 
continuity requires continuous server uptime and meeting this demand is costly in terms of redundancy, 
management and maintenance. The solution could be a virtual infrastructure. In the research paper by 
Wesley Emeneker, et al; they implement a system of virtual machines [2] to increase cluster utilization by 
enabling job forwarding and spanning, that flexibly allow software environment changes, and effectively 
sandbox users and processes from each other and the system. The authors here have created an initial 
implementation of DVC model that has reduced the queue wait and turnaround time, and increased job 
throughput. They have implemented a model that performs forwarding and spanning with VMs which can 
improve cluster utilization, increase throughput, and decrease turnaround time. Similar to the DVC model, a 
model that also improves cluster utilization by reducing downtime time through implementation of dynamic 
cluster reservation supported by live migration of VMs would facilitate efficient vacation of resources using 
scheduling algorithm (load balancing algorithm) so as to fully utilize resources. This further research which 
was based on the idea of utilizing one such published scheduling algorithm provided by VMWare and as 
known in virtual world as Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS) that automatically detects workload 
hotspots and schedules resource allocation across VMs and migrates them to underutilized servers was 




It is important to detect workload hotspots which arise if the demand exceeds allocated capacity. An 
efficient way to overcome this is to build a framework for dynamic allocation of resources that can be 
adjusted based on workload. This framework must be secure and not allowed to be compromised. 
Virtualization which is one of the hottest concepts these days can be utilized to make sure that resources are 
used more efficiently as it has the capability to adjust resource provisioning while maintaining isolation. 
Live VM Migration is a virtualization concept that can be used to create such a model. 
Furthermore, as described in the paper by Marvin McNett, et al (2007); they describe the implementation of 
Usher [3] as a cluster management system. The system is designed to substantially reduce the administrative 
burden of managing cluster resources while simultaneously improving the ability of users to request, control, 
and customize their resources and computing environment, enabling administrators to choose how their VM 
environment will be configured and the policies under which they will be managed. Usher multiplexes 
individual VMs on available physical machine hardware and allows creating and use of machines according 
to the needs rather than according to assigned physical resources by decoupling logical machine resources 
from physical machines. Now to have a similar model that does dynamic allocation of resources and a model 
that performs automatic computation to determine which physical resources are overloaded and then by 
allocating resources to relevant VMs, perform VM scheduling to migrate VMs to appropriate underutilized 
server, would be an approach that administrators would look forward to implementing as a model for their 
VM migration policy and so that idea was experimented in my research using the concept of DRS. 
When we discussing the resource management model, we need to consider which portions of resource slots 
can be bound either to virtual resources or to overhead associated with the creation or maintenance of those 
virtual resources. Borja Sotomayor, et al; in their implementation of Virtual Resource Management Model 
[4] (2007) have implemented a model that manages the overhead of using VMs to minimize the negative 
effects on performance and leverage virtualization features that could increase utilization of physical 
resources. They have suggested use of multiple techniques like Draining, Backfilling and Suspend-Resume 
to evaluate scheduling accuracy and efficiency. While their implementation was focused on deployment of 




measuring the utilization of resources and allocating them to appropriate VMs. Sotomayor, et al, have tested 
their model against real as well artificial workloads which will be done for the current study too, not based 
on user requests for virtual workspace but for performance testing of the physical servers that host these 
resources. Virtual Resource Management model was more or less based on models conceived earlier like 
“Virtuoso and VSched” [5] (2005) and “Shirako” [6] (2006). These models are quite similar to the Virtual 
Resource Management Model wherein the authors created a virtual workspace from scratch but with certain 
assumptions like no preparation overhead during resource leasing in case of virtual clusters were being 
deployed on multiple physicals clusters and no deployment overhead while co-scheduling interactive and 
batch workloads on individuals machines. While these models missed out or deliberately not consider 
overheads (preparation overhead as in case of Virtuoso and deployment overhead as in case of Shirako), the 
current research considers overheads due to Live Migration of VMs while resource reservation takes place 
based on utilization of physical servers like for instance variation of memory load and network overload 
factor which was studied and researched by carrying out tests that show results that are used during dynamic 
load balancing. 
While physical machine state is protected by hardware, virtual machine state is protected by 
VMM/hypervisor and software attacks are perpetrated due to weak VMM isolation. Full VM state is 
exposed to the network during migration as there is no encryption involved. Security concerns range from 
authentication to confidentiality to isolation. In the paper [8] by Jon Oberheide et al, they have discussed 
about the different classes of threat to the Live Migration process. They have given a detailed report of their 
investigation of possible attack classes during the live migration process. A compromised system inside a 
network employing live migrations can facilitate un-trusted access to migrating Virtual Machines. While 
they have discussed different attack classes, they have not elaborated on the effects of these attacks or 
security implications over the migration process and (specifically) the concept of dynamic load balancing 
facilitated by Live Migration of VMs. This current thesis research identifies the effects of the security lapse 
on the migration process and specially, the effect on the performance factors of virtual machines. I have 




vMotion using varying memory values and network load. This research has used MiTM as the major attack 
class along with host of other attacks like sniffing or gathering data; fingerprinting VMWare products and 
brute force attack to retrieve hypervisor login information. 
Resource utilization in expensive servers is often at 25% average. As mentioned earlier the practice of 
assigning one application or service to its own physical server can be costly. A virtual infrastructure 
improves resource utilization and high priced servers can be justified. Administrators can look at their 
servers as a big pool of resources and map virtual machines with running services to any part of this 
resource pool without having to think about available resources on a specific host. This in turn also prevents 
the proliferation of physical servers. Espen Braastad (2006) describes the need for open source tools capable 
of providing migration of VMs as a method for virtualization and repair. [7] He describes the use of 
‘Heartbeat’ as high availability software that seamlessly migrates VMs between physical nodes in the 
cluster. This paper evaluates migration of VMs using Heartbeat based on impact on TCP and UDP services 
and also the users of high availability services. The core discussion presented here is the results related to 
failures in case of migration and effect on network performance. While network performance is very 
important for administrators, it would be a significant measurement to test the migration traffic. Evaluating 
this migration traffic was a part of the current research so as to determine the most appropriate model for 
resources to be migrated using VMs across the network which was done using VMWare measurement tools 
provided by Veeam coupled with VMWare’s inbuilt virtual infrastructure components. The effect of 
exploiting the migration traffic can be evaluated and to determine what transpires in the network pipe during 
the migration process is an integral part of this current thesis research which showed how the total migration 
time is affected and what is the change in migration delay as compared with varying values of memory and 
migration delay comparison study between migration of VMs in sequence against parallel.  
A literature study by Andre van Cleeff, et al. [19] has details and charts of security impact per feature group 
that includes hardware, VM, VMM, VMMM, emergent. These feature groups have been weighed against 
various exploits and vulnerabilities which affect one or more properties like confidentiality, integrity, 




the vulnerabilities like for instance data integrity during vMotion when data which may be financial records 
or otherwise are seen in cleartext just by sniffing or MiTM attack.  
Furthermore, Ming Zhao, et al. [21] in their “Experimental study of virtual Machine migration in support of 
reservation of Cluster Resources”, has provided us with an experimental model which can predict 
performance of VM migration process. While their experimental model was not based on VMWare 
vMotion, mine was. I was able see similar results using scenarios from their experimental study but for 
VMWare vMotion while theirs was based on stop-copy-resume migration strategy. 
Administrators who work in virtualized domain [20] have tried and tested exploits that compromise such 
systems like using MiTM attacks, stealing guest VMs, credential harvester attack, taking control of 
management servers and console. So I have used these instances and methodologies as described in the 
world of hacker or for an ethical tester – penetration tester, to understand the logs and performance 
parameters of a breach. My results show graphical representations of the timeframe during the vMotion 
breach or virtualization exploit. While the scope of their might be larger as compared to mine, I have tried to 
encapsulate various factors related to VM migration and the threats related to it. 
Exploits related to resources when network is flooded is a case wherein I tried to chalk out a result that tells 
me how the live migration is affected even if there is no attempt to steal or corrupt data. My research is an 
attempt to get a behind-the-scenes glimpse of live migration exploit or stress testing. 
 
The above reviewed literature presents different oversights to resource allocation and virtualization concepts 
along with possible security loopholes. Each of the them have their significant problem statements that the 
authors have tried to overcome and present a model or infrastructure to create an efficient methodology. The 
current research idea will be based on some of these concepts and support or prove them in an alternative 
approach. The current research approach will use some of the ideas from these models and act as a guide for 








Live Virtual Machine Migration 
 
What is Live Virtual Machine Migration? 
To put the answer in most simplest terms would be “transfer of VM/s from one physical machine to another 
with minimal or no service downtime”. 
 
Figure 4. Virtual Machine Migration 
 









Following are some specific migration techniques [9]: 
Stop-and-Copy Migration - This type of migration is non-live migration. This type of migration results in 
VM downtime. This works well for VMs under maintenance. The only positive aspect of this type of 
migration is that it provides a baseline to compare the total number of pages transferred and the total 
migration time.  
Following are the details regarding stop-and-copy migration: 
- The source VM (one that has to be migrated) is stopped (shutdown). 
- All the pages are copied over the network. 
- Finally the destination VM is started. 
- This migration type has longest service downtime. 
- This migration type has the shortest migration duration. 
Demand Migration – This type of migration is based on post-copy based live VM migration. 
Following are the details regarding demand migration: 
- Initially all the critical and essential OS structures are copied over the network. 
- Then the destination VM is started. 
- Every page fault triggers copy of those pages over the network. 
- This migration type has shortest service downtime. 
- This migration type has the longest migration duration. 
Iterative Pre-Copy Migration – This type of migration combines pre-copy migration with a bounded 
iterative push phase. This migration type also involves a very short stop-and-copy phase.  
Following are the details regarding iterative pre-copy migration: 
- Iteratively copies pages over the network from source to destination. 
- Keeps copying pages until a particular threshold is reached, then stops source VM and further copies 
all the remaining pages, before finally starting the destination VM. 























Security Risks – Holistic View 
 
Companies which network their computers for cost-saving purposes by using live virtual machine migration 
are vulnerable to hackers/attackers. Since live virtual machine migration is relatively new, allowing virtual 
machines to migrate between servers with little or no service downtime and thus help load balance across 
several servers; the security of live virtual machine migration has not been researched upon extensively. 
It is possible that hackers/attackers compromise the integrity of a virtual machine's operating system during 
live migration because even though virtualization-based companies have created software that makes it easy 
for reducing server downtime and equalize loads when there is fluctuations across the servers, these software 
do not encrypt the data (virtual machines in this case) as it migrates from one server to other server.  
While a short-term fix would be to isolate network used for migration from other network traffic or have the 
data encrypted by using some reputed hardware encryption software, there is an urgent need to educate 
companies and raise awareness about this vulnerability. 
To understand how the security of virtual environment can be compromised, it was essential to think like an 
attacker. So this chapter provides an overview of types of attacks and how they work and gives the point 
view of a Penetration Tester, hacker or disgruntled employee. 
Common Types of Attacks  
1. Buffer Overflows  
This class of attack involves data being written into a buffer which is greater than the allocated space of that 
buffer, resulting in corruption of memory inside a running process. The reason behind such an attack could 
be to either halt that running process or call an injected malicious code as a result of buffer overflow. 
2. Heap Overflows 
This attack class occurs in heap data area and is a type of buffer overflow. As in case with buffer overflow, 




which causes the overwriting of metadata of the succeeding chunk. Again, the attacker data may contain 
malicious code. 
3. Web-based Attacks 
o Fake Certificate Injection 
An attacker acts as a man-in the middle between the website and the computer trying to access that website. 
By using this type of attack, the attacker, much like a proxy server, after taking requests from an 
unsuspecting user, makes some (possibly) malicious changes and forwards the changed request to the target. 
But since the query has been tampered with, the user gets back a new location that the attacker wants 
him/her to go to. 
o Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
Using this type of computer security vulnerability, an attacker (malicious web user) can inject malicious 
code into the web applications. Such vulnerability is usually used by the attacker to bypass access controls, 
for phishing attacks and browser exploits. Type 1 XSS or non-persistent is a reflected vulnerability which 
shows up when server-side scripts instantly use the data provided by web clients without validating the 
received data which can allow insertion of client-side code into dynamic web pages. Type 2 XSS or 
persistent is a second order attack. This type of vulnerability occurs when the data provided by the user to 
the web application is stored persistently (in database or file systems), and is displayed on to the web page 
without being encoded using HTML. 
4. SQL Injection 
When an input provided to a web application in interpreted as a SQL input and the application replies back 
with a failure message, the attacker is able to realize that the target application is vulnerable to SQL 
injection. In this type of attack, the attacker tries to get around the filters by testing out the weaknesses of the 
filters by querying the filters persistently. So basically, SQL injection takes place when data is inputted to 
the SQL query engine that is not expected by the web user. 
5. Layer 2 Attacks 




CAM table is simply Dynamic Content Addressable Memory on an Ethernet switch and is responsible for 
correctly echoing out the frames out of relevant port or else the switch is no different from a hub. If an 
attacker gets control of any device that is connected to the Ethernet switch, he/she can attack the CAM table 
by MAC flooding which is vulnerability in the design of the switch when the switch has no more space to 
record MAC address to Port mapping during its learning stage. So as a result, switch loses its identity and 
begins forwarding any received frames out of all ports, like a hub. 
o Double Encapsulation Attacks 
Such attacks are common in VLAN environments and so they are also referred to as VLAN hopping attacks. 
The transmitted frames are tagged with a “VTag” identifier so as to forward these frames to wrong VLAN. 
o Multicast Brute Force Attacks  
This attack uses the switch’s vulnerability to a storm of multicast frames. When the switch receives such a 
storm of multicast frames rapidly, it will try to constrain the traffic to the original VLAN but failing to do so 
results in frame leaks to other VLANs which may potentially be malicious.  
o Spanning Tree Attacks 
Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is responsible in avoiding switching or bridging loops that cause broadcast 
storms, which can bring the L2 networks to its knees. In STP, path redundancy is enabled to prevent 
network loops by assigning ports in forwarding or blocked state, all of which is done by use of election 
based on MAC address value. So in spanning tree attacks, attacker can force an alternate election which may 
be rigged by making its MAC value higher than root bridge value and hence compromising the entire 
network. 
o Random Frame Attacks 
This attack involves attacker randomly varying the fields of a packet without changing the source and 
destination addresses. So the attacker is able to send out unwanted malicious traffic to Private VLANs from 
untrustworthy devices. 





Attacker predominantly uses ARP cache poisoning so a mode of attack for Layer 3 non-router. During ARP 
broadcast, the protocol believes in anything that it is told even though it may not have asked for that 
information. The attacker can send out ARP cache update with malicious information by forging the 
contents causing the victim’s machine to expire its own cache. The attacker is able to sniff, modify and drop 
packets by poisoning the default gateway and victim’s machine by making them believe that his is the 
requested machine. So basically the attack is directed towards TCP/IP V4 protocol stack which might 
require replacement. 
7. DNS Attacks 
o DNS Cache Poisoning Attack 
This attack involves changing the values in the cache that contain previous lookup requests. So by 
controlling the name resolutions of the sites, the attacker could send unsuspecting users to fake sites without 
the users knowing the difference. 
o Pharming Using the Host File 
While this is similar to DNS poisoning, the attacker makes changes to the host file rather than the DNS 
server. Since TCP/IP protocol consults the host file for resolving DNS names to IP addresses, by any 
changes to this file, the user may get redirected to fake site even though he/she is typing the correct URL. 
8. Layer 3 Routing Attacks 
o Route Table Poisoning 
Route table poisoning is inserting fake routes in victim router’s routing table by using outdated routing 
protocols like RIPv1 or IGRP that do not require authentication. 
o Source Routed Packets 
In this type of attack, the attacker changes the information in the source routing table of the packet itself 
which causes the packet to select its own path to destination. So basically, the attacker modifies or poisons 
each router. 




If the integrity of the channel used for communication between two devices or parties is not ensured along 
with the verification of the identity of the parties at both ends of this channel, then MiTM attack can easily 
be put into action. MiTM examples include standard MiTM Arp cache Poison attack, SSL attack and iSCSI 
MiTM. Such an attack is used to accomplish the following: 
Impersonate – Attacker tries to impersonate the victim for intercepting messages and send fake certificate to 
sender. 
Eavesdrop – Attacker tries to intercept and listen in on traffic by forcing it pass by a hodgepodge enabled 
NIC.  
Modify – Attacker can modify the message if he is able to decrypt the message to plain text. 
Replay of Messages – Similar to network injection attacks, the attacker who is able to listen in on the traffic 
can change the sequence of the packets making up the message by doctoring the sequence and hence causing 
the replay of packets due to incorrect sequencing. 
Prevent Clock Synchronization – Attacker may prevent synchronization of sender and receiver clocks so as 
to listen in on the traffic as the synchronized clocks make it difficult to snoop around. 
Organizations, either big or small, never want their live systems to be interrupted if they are using 
virtualization technologies as that would defeat the whole purpose of high-availability features. But such 
organizations do fail to understand the security risks involved in live migration of virtual machines. 
 
While any and all of the above mentioned vulnerabilities and attack classes would work in creating 
operational hazards with respect to the virtualized environment, there are certain known virtualization 
system attacks which have been documented. [10] 
1. Management Server attacks – The management console can be exploited to gain login information 
and hence eventually access to the management server. Also these attacks can allow attacker to 




2. Admin VM attacks – These attacks result in Denial of Service resulting in crashing admin VM. 
Passwords stored in cleartext can be obtained easily and which can lead to attackers bypassing 
authentication. 
3. Guest VM attacks – Similar to admin VM attack, this attack can include gaining increased privileges, 
crashing VM, executing rogue code with admin permissions. 
































Design and Implementation 
 
The goal of this study was to test the impact security exploits has on a virtualized environment within a 
typical (simulated) network environment by using consistent, mixed workload simulation.  
To accomplish the goals stated above, I created a simulated datacenter consisting of Windows Server 2003 
Standard Edition which was the domain controller, two ESX hosts running at at least two virtual machines 
(VM) each and a virtual machine for VMware vCenter Management Server hosted on Windows Server 2003 
Standard Edition. All these servers were the upper level Virtual machines as shown in the generic view 





Figure 6. Design Architecture 
 
Being able to run VMware ESX 4.0 and higher under VMware Workstation as a VM, gives IT professional 
great flexibility. This enables them to test and experiment with products. While the approach is similar to 





I used three laptops for my testing purpose. Following are the configurations for those laptops: 
Hewlett Packard (HP) Pavilion v6000 laptop computer had the following specification: 
• Intel Core 3i M370 2.40GHz CPU 
• 4GB RAM 
• Windows 7 Home Premium 32-bit 
Lenovo R400 laptop computer had the following specification:  
• Intel Mobile Core 2 Duo P8700 2.53GHz CPU  
• 6GB RAM  
• Windows 7 Professional 64-bit  
Dell Inspiron 8600 laptop computer had the following specification: 
• Intel Pentium M Processor 1.60GHz CPU  
• 1GB RAM  
• Windows Server 2003 R2 Standard Edition  
Software Used 
• VMWare ESXi 4.0 Releasebuild-171294 [16] 
• VMware Workstation 6.5.1 (Build 126130) [15] 
• OpenFiler NSA ver 2.3 (Virtual SAN for shared storage - free) [11] 
• BackTrack 4 (Penetration testing CD) and Wireshark (Sniffer and Analyzer) [12] 
• Veeam Monitor and Reporter(Management tools for VMWare infrastructure – free) [13][14] 



































































Results – Research and Testing 
 
Starting off with testing the security loopholes in live migration of VMs, I chose the VMWare technology 
and hence the exploitation of Vmotion which is a patented VMWare technology. Using the design 
architecture that I mentioned in the Chapter 3, I setup two ESXi hosts which were version 4.0 (Build 
171294). I setup a third computer which acted as the vCenter server (management server). I proceeded by 
creating VMs on each of these hosts which were primarily unix/linux based. Below shown is the layout of 
the vcenter server which has been aptly named as “VCENTER”. There is a datacenter named “Thesis” with 
a cluster (Melvin) of ESXi Hosts, VMs and templates. Also the Datastore view shows the two local storage 
called ‘Local1’ belonging to “10.0.0.84” and ‘Local2’ belonging to “10.0.0.85”. VSAN is the virtual shared 
storage that has the storage limit of 200 Gb which seemed to serve well for this research. 
                                               
Figure 12. vCenter View                                         
Speaking of security, by default, the VMotion encryption is disabled and most system administrators fail to 
realize the consequence of that setting assuming that organization firewall would protect against all external 




               
    Figure 13. vCenter Server settings window 
 
Technically speaking, vMotion traffic should be isolated which means that it is recommended that we use a 
separate physical switch or isolate vMotion traffic with a VLAN. The greatest drawback of vMotion is that 
any related traffic (memory contents of a VM) is transmitted in clear text. There is always a concern as to 
someone could sniff the network and eventually get access to the memory contents of the VM. 
Non-Live Virtual Machine Migration  
Initially, exploitation was carried out with power-off VMs so as to compare results with results of exploits 
with powered-on VMs. It was discovered that if VMs are powered-off, any exploits that were carried out 
were futile with no loss to application data or virtual machine except in case wherein exploits against VMs 
involving stealing of guests entirely which meant copying VM files and changing them and pushing them 




Following exploits carried out using the VASTO plugin in Metasploit 3 from BackTrack 4 are related to 
gaining host based information like and login credentials.  
Figure 14. Metasploit Shell console 
 
Figure 15. ‘VMWARE_VERSION’ exploit: 
 
As we see that using this plugin, I was able to extract the versions and build of the ESXi hosts. Using this 




Figure 16a. ‘VMWARE_LOGIN’ exploit: 
 
Using this plugin, I was able to brute force login information from the ESXi hosts. Like get the username 
and password information which have been blanked out as shown below. 






Live Virtual Machine Migration 
Now to illustrate the important part of this thesis, that is based on Live Migration of Virtual machines. 
Trying to exploit and observe this type of migration process is the main purpose of this thesis paper.  
Test Method 1 (using Wireshark) 
During testing, I created a scenario in where I wanted to sniff and analyze VM guest memory during the 
transition phase known as VMotion. Taking the advantage of the default encryption mode (=disabled) of 
VMotion,  I initially used only Wireshark (formerly Ethereal) which is an sniffing tool, to capture and 
analyze packets created on the network due the transfer of VM from one ESXi host to another. The VM that 
I used was a linux-based Operating System called as “Damn Small Linux” aptly named as DSL in the 
vCenter. I setup the VM Portgroup to accept promiscuous mode where the Wireshark is running. 
 
Figure 17. Wireshark settings 
In DSL, I opened up a terminal session and simply wrote onto a file (saved it as a text document) using the 
‘CAT’ command. This was done while sniffer was doing its job. I “VMotioned” the guest VM (DSL) from 
one ESXi host to other (10.0.0.84  10.0.0.85). When Vmotion was complete, I stopped the sniffer and 
analyzed the sniff wherein I noticed that I was able to see my entire operation including the commands that I 






Figure 18a. Wireshark sniffing results 
So continuing on with the test, I enabled VMotion Encryption and selected “Required” over “Best Effort”. 
From the research and reading that I have done so far, I am optimistic that the result is going to be the same 
and I was correct. Wireshark has still been able to sniff out the TCP data allowing me to see plain text that’s 
crossing the network. How can this be? As with any system administrator, thinking that restarting services of 
the ESXi host machines and checking if “vCenter.VMotionEncryption” setting was applied correctly, I did 
the same but still VMotion remains unencrypted. Is this a bug? Probably so, but after such instances being 
reported over past two years VMWare would have been expected to provide a patch. But again not to sound 
critical, VMWare has come up with application like vShield to protect VMotion. 
While wireshark displayed plain text data passing over the network during VMotion, I was also able to view 





Figure 18b. Wireshark sniffing results 
Test Method 2 (using Backtrack – ARP Poisoning MiTM) 
Let me elaborate the exploits that I carried out in such a scenario. Using one of most powerful penetration 
testing and hacking utilities provided by BackTrack, certain exploits like gaining ESXi host-based 
information like root logins, versions, builds, number of VMs residing on each host, and so forth, was 
collected, which is an enormous security risk. Along with the above information that was easily acquired, I 
was also able to access VM file structure and hence unleash an exploit called as “Guest Stealer”.  
Having conducted these exploits, gave me certain insights to possible loopholes in virtualization security 
and so I took the next step as to exploit powered-on VMs while in transit. Since this research was 
concentrated towards VMWare appliances, I proceeded to exploit “VMOTION”.  
One of the most well-known attacker-victim based scenario is Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack which I 
incorporated using ARP poisoning methodology.  
MITM attacks are most often attacks against data confidentiality and these attacks run at layer 2. It is easily 




Active and Passive. While active attack involves modifying data packets as they are intercepted, passive 
attack is more concentrated towards stealing information in transit without modifying it. Passive attack is 
more common MITM as it is easy to execute. I will be demonstrating a passive MITM attack on Vmotion. 
I started off by executing an ARP poison on the attacker – 10.0.0.15, using ETTERCAP. The attack wrote 
the output to a text file. The victim machines are the two ESXi hosts – 10.0.0.84 and 10.0.0.85. 
 
Figure 19. Metasploit – Ettercap (ARP Poisoning - Start) 
 
The attacker started sniffing on the 10.0.0.0/24 network but specifically for data exchange between the ESXi 
hosts Rochester (10.0.0.84) and Milan (10.0.0.85). I proceeded to write data onto a file on the VM that I 





Figure 20. VM data preparation before Live Migration 
I saved this data to the file using ‘cat’ command. Then I proceeded to perform live migration of the VM 
(DSL) from 10.0.0.84 to 10.0.0.85 using Vmotion as shown below. 
 




The process of live migration took less than about a minute to complete which was extended making me 
believe that the MITM attack had something to do with it. I was able to observe this as I compared the first 
method using wireshark with this current attempt by using ARP poisoning. While the data travelled directly 
from source to destination in first case and wireshark sniffed packets on the network; using MITM, TCP 
packets were first intercepted by attacker (10.0.0.15) and then forwarded to destination. Following graphics 



















I will discuss more about the above observed facts as I proceed. So once, the live migration was completed 
successfully, I went back to the attacker and stopped the ARP Poison attack. As you can notice below, the 
attacker was kind enough to re-arp the victims back to original state. 
 
Figure 25. Metasploit – Ettercap (ARP Poisoning - Stop) 
Now that attacker had sniffed the packets while the Vmotion was in progress; the attacker machine 
(10.0.0.15) needed to analyze the raw packets. While there are multiple ways to do that like simply open the 
output text file that was recording the network data packets and search for the string or numeric data or 
conduct a TCP dump from the file based on word count and/or string which would mean scanning each page 
or filtering out using a search parameter. I chose to simply use the ‘find’ option to look for the string that I 
knew was written on to the file in the VM. Below shown is the complete data that was entered in the VM 
and sniffed out during the MITM attack. 
 







In this part of the experiment, I created an artificial workload which would serve as the network traffic 
generator from a range of IP ranges on the same network as the ESXi host machine. I generated about 100 
billion TCP packets and targeted it towards one of the ESXi host (10.0.0.85).  
 
Figure 27. Network Packet Generator - TCP 
I proceeded to check the vCenter and wanted to carry out a migration from that EXi host to other host. But, 
this extreme bombardment of network traffic towards the ESXi host caused the host to disconnect from the 




            Figure 28. Result of Artificial network traffic 
 
Let me also mention that before I bombarded the ESXi host with network traffic, I tested to see if that 
similar traffic could be tested against the vCenter server. But apart from spikes in network counters like 
network usage, transmit rate, receive rate, packets transmitted and packets received, the live migration of 







Figure 29. Graphical representation for Network traffic conjestion 
 
Moving ahead, I created network traffic while the vMotion was in progress, the same scenario popped up 
and the vCenter lost connection with the ESXi host and eventually all the VMs associated with the host, I 
waited for about 15minutes for the reaction of the migration process. Hoping for the worst, as I stopped the 
artificial traffic towards the ESXi host, the live migration failed as expected but the VM was unharmed. The 
VM was still in live state and I was able to access the VM. Performance counters within the vSphere client 
for vCenter showed elevated readings for CPU, System and Network. There was no trace of any activity for 
Memory and Disk performance counters which points to lost connectivity with storage and no heartbeat 
detected otherwise. 
 






Figure 31. Host connection lost (vCenter graphs) 
 









Figure 34a. Network readings during hung state 
 
When the ESXi host machine detected about 2.5 Mbps of traffic through its network interface, the process of 
live migration of the VM (DSL) was sent in halted state which we can see from the graphical representation 
below, was extended for about 15 minutes. After the artificial traffic was ceased, the VM failed to recognize 
the storage adaptor and the tunnel to the destination ESXi host was disconnected. The process of vMotion 
failed but VM was unharmed and subsequent vMotion worked correctly. From this output we can assume 
that creating workload hotspots does create issues with vMotion. This is an security risk as even though the 
extended state of vMotion did not harm the VM in this case, but if there were workloads that were severe 
enough to cut the vMotion in half creating a split image, then the VM could be thrown in unstable state and 
hence non-recoverable from this crash. 
 





Workload distribution for virtual machines 
 
The goal for this test scenario was to research and test an efficient virtual machine based resource 
reservation in a clustered environment. This had to be done by making sure that resources are vacated in 
time without underutilizing the resources allocated to it. The model that I worked on has been already tested 
and my idea for test analysis is solely to test the security implication of the exploits at the time of this 
distribution. [17] 
Using Distribution Resource Scheduler (DRS), which allows concurrent migrations by allowing cluster 
resources to be, divided into smaller resource pools for the VMs. Since the major concept of DRS is to 
enable automatic assignment of VMs to hosts managed through vCenter so as to load balance resources, I 
was intrigued as how this would react if there was security threat that indicated performance counter 








So as I went about testing Live VM migration, I tested based on VM memory. First test was done while 
migrating single VM (DSL) based on varying memory values ranging from 64 Mb to 512 Mb and for each 
value, I was able to observe that there was an exponential increase in the migration delay (in seconds). This 
delay can be attributed to the suspension of VM at the source rather than resume phase at the destination. 
The memory range was created using a rogue memory injection program which was basically a stress test 
tool available as freeware from Google. This stress test tool prolonged the suspend phase at source during 
vMotion which is due to extra time needed for synchronization.  
Not being too familiar with as how DRS would react in such a scenario, wherein memory injection needing 
more resource from the Host, I failed to notice the change. I could not stress test beyond 512 Mb every time 
I tried doing that my ESXi host machine would go in non-responsive state with 2 out of 3 VMs alive during 
this state. So DRS would not kick in when it was supposed to leading to this failed state. 
 
Figure 36. Single VM – Migration delay  
 
 
Since DRS failed to act upon the load balancing state, I proceeded to test using migrating sequence of VMs 
which were similar in performance. Let me mention this as a reminder that migration is a memory intensive 
process and it was necessary to account for performance degradation. When live VMs were migrated in 
sequence the migration delays seemed nominal as Host based resource pool had enough time to finish 




workload was iteratively run so that 100% CPU was consumed, the applications or processes that were 
running on VMs take longer to complete. 
 
Figure 37. Two VMs – Migration delay 
 
Finally when I worked on migrating VMs in parallel, I had to compare it with the results as seen in 
sequential process. Since all this resource handling is done on the Host machine, the migration time is 
obviously going to vary based on the fact whether it is sequential or parallel. Parallel migration results in 
resources on the Host being freed up sooner and hence the total migration time is shorter as compared to 
sequential process which takes longer overall migration time but shorter time per-VM and lesser impact at 
the application level.  
I performed the same test for workload disturbance and distribution so as to achieve DRS and this time I 
coupled memory variation test with network load stress. At about 2.5 Mbps of bandwidth being utilized for 
the network, varying memory load between 64 Mb and 512 Mb, I was able to observe that DRS kicked in, 
the VM in transit was forced back to source host in case migration state between 25% and 75%. This was 
observed when destination host was bombarded with TCP packets. Above 75%, there was a crash in 





Figure 38 – Comparison graph – Sequential vs Parallel Migration time  
 
 
Letting VMs juggle between ESXi hosts depending on resource pool load on the Hosts is what DRS does. 
But since we are looking at security implications of this concept, so if DRS is smart enough to relocate VMs 
if the resource pool is overworked for one Host and under-worked for other, it most certainly does not 
understand that if this VM is overworked may it may CPU or Memory, is that due to natural cause or 
artificial reasons like rogue memory stress tool. If the memory stress tool manages to extend the VMs 
resources which are acquired from the Host itself, then if DRS kicks in and performs Live migration, then it 
pre-medicated by the attacker who is waiting on the network to sniffed out the data transfer due to vMotion 
and/or exploit virtual machine files by injecting unsuspecting code like botnet, etc. 
As an end of the testing for dynamic allocation, I exploited the live migration using MiTM attack. The 
results were similar except that due to increased migration time, the range for DRS being activated was 
narrowed down and took place early in the cycle. One of the other instance in which I started the network 
packet generation late in the cycle after migration began, DRS failed and VM went in inactive state which 
told me that vMotion failed due to extreme network conditions. The destination hypervisor which was 
bombarded with TCP packets lost connection with vCenter and VM migration which was at 80% migration 








From the beginning of the 21
st
 century, more companies and businesses have started switching over to 
virtualization technology but also since the time the modern virtualization system as existed, vulnerabilities 
have been around. As per the statistics, 40% of the reported vulnerabilities and threats to the virtualized 
environments have high severity because these setups have been fairly easy to exploit and resulting in open-
ended attacks that allow attackers to gain complete control. The result of all the reported vulnerabilities to 
virtualized systems over past 10 years indicates a growing trend in attacks to servers as well as workstations. 
Most of these attacks have been accounted for in production systems which run on hypervisors while 
workstations which are on top of host OS. 
 
 




Unlike non-virtualized systems in which vulnerabilities affect users, hardware and operating system, 
vulnerabilities in virtualized systems are more widespread and hence categorized in different classes.  
 





The above results have been derived from research conducted by IBM Corporation. There are newer 
evolving virtualization system-specific attacks like VM jumping (using hypervisor escape attacker is able to 
jump from one victim VM to other), attacks on VM during deployment which lead to control of those VMs, 
rogue code injection into the VMs file structure and Live VM migration attack using MiTM attack class, as 
described and experimented for this paper. Lately, there is a new virtualization attack class called as 
Hyperjacking which involves deployment of a rogue hypervisor resulting in attacker assuming control of the 



























This paper has demonstrated how one of the most popular and widely deployed VMM - VMware is 
vulnerable to practical attacks targeting their live migration functionality. These threats are cause for 
concern and require that appropriate solutions be applied to each class of live migration threats. This paper is 
in no way a criticism of virtualization technology especially VMWare. I personally am a follower and user 
of VMWare technologies and this paper is research in progress of security around virtual technologies which 
should not be taken for granted.  
 
In order to make sure that live migration of virtual machines is secure, there needs to be an authentication 
algorithm that protects the communication pane not only between the source and destination VMMs but also 
the management servers and agents. The administrator should have access to security policies that controls 
effective migration of privileges that are assigned to various players involved during the course of migration. 
The so-called tunnel used by migration must be secure and have policies setup so as to detect sniffing and 
manipulation of the data or migration state during the migration phase. This can be done by making sure the 
vMotion parameter is encrypted correctly which at the moment seems to be in a state of testing or needs 
extensive add-ons and monitoring.  
 
One important thing that can be established is setting up of separate virtual switches for vMotion that is kept 
aloof from other network objects and tasks. Also vMotion takes place in cleartext by default and VMWare 
encryption for vMotion is not full-proof as evident from the tests conducted; administrators need to test 
vMotion before the production servers go online. Administrators can also try to incorporate tested 
encryption algorithms for vMotion to work securely. A timely audit of these parameters is necessary so as to 





Having mentioned earlier in my report, this research and analysis is no way a criticism or deterrent to use 
vMotion in production environment. Over the past decade, VMWare has invested considerably towards their 
hypervisor security with introduction of VMSafe and VShield that provides APIs for partnering companies 
(mainly security firms) to develop patches for the virtualized system. These patches include monitors for 
VM’s memory, virtual disk and/or drivers. 
Since I have been able to successfully replicate the exploits as performed by experts and understand the 
performance-related results, where do we stand after this and what should be done for future? 
Management of virtual infrastructure should be done with a strict code of conduct. Security policies should 
be re-visited. There should a close monitor for any changes to the virtualized systems as while it is easy to 
execute changes, it is difficult to manage them. Any exploit like stolen guest VM can be used someplace 
else and if for instance it a database server, the nothing can stop the thief from stealing data. Furthermore, it 
is possible to look into limiting VM intervention by focusing on availability such that the application 
running on the VM is not affected due to intervention and data is not compromised. So basically to avoid 
integrity and confidentiality loss, we can focus on loss of availability. 
As any administrator can understand that any vulnerability to network security could result in breach of data 
and intellectual property but when it comes to VM migration that involves full OS, any compromise to the 
network can also result in breach of VMM integrity. So to sum it up, the approach towards securing a 
virtualized network needs certain add-ons to access control and a methodology that assures complete 
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Appendix - Report 
 
Description 





Shared Datastores 1 
Datastores 2 
Hosts 2 
Virtual Machines 5 
 
 
Operating System Running Total 
FreeBSD (32-bit) 0 1 
Other (32-bit) 1 3 










VSAN 10.0.0.84; 10.0.0.85 
 
 




Local1 VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 






























































Current Speed (MB) 0 
Driver iscsi_vmk 
ISCSI Name iqn.2006-01.com.openfiler:tsn.e5cba8c98c8c 
Key key-vim.host.InternetScsiHba-vmhba33 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmhba33 
Max Speed (MB) 0 
Model iSCSI Software Adapter 
Name vmhba33 
PCI UNKNOWN - NULL PCI DEV IN VMKCTL 
Status unknown 









Current Speed (MB) 0 
Driver iscsi_vmk 
ISCSI Name iqn.1998-01.com.vmware:milan-1a41a0cf 
Key key-vim.host.InternetScsiHba-vmhba33 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmhba33 
Max Speed (MB) 0 
Model iSCSI Software Adapter 
Name vmhba33 
PCI UNKNOWN - NULL PCI DEV IN VMKCTL 
Status unknown 











Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmhba1 












Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmhba1 













Name VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
Block 419430400 
Block Size 512 
Capacity 200 GB 
Device Name /vmfs/devices/disks/mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
Device Type disk 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Key key-vim.host.ScsiDisk-0000000000766d686261313a303a30 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
LUN Type disk 
Model VMware Virtual S 
Name VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
Revision 1.0  
SCSI Level 2 
SCSI Level Specified True 
Serial Number unavailable 
Type VimApi.HostScsiDisk 
Uuid 0000000000766d686261313a303a30 









Block Size 512 













LUN Type disk 





Revision 0    
SCSI Level 4 












Name VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
Block 419430400 
Block Size 512 
Capacity 200 GB 
Device Name /vmfs/devices/disks/mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
Device Type disk 
Host 10.0.0.85 
Key key-vim.host.ScsiDisk-0000000000766d686261313a303a30 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
LUN Type disk 
Model VMware Virtual S 
Name VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0 
Revision 1.0  
SCSI Level 2 
SCSI Level Specified True 
Serial Number unavailable 
Type VimApi.HostScsiDisk 
Uuid 0000000000766d686261313a303a30 









Block Size 512 













LUN Type disk 








Revision 0    
SCSI Level 4 
SCSI Level Specified True 













Capacity 195.75 GB 
Capacity (GB) numeric 195.75 
Free Space 163.054 GB 
Free Space (GB) numeric 163.054 
FS block size 1 MB 
FS type VMFS 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>VSAN 
Managed Object Reference datastore-213 












Capacity 195 GB 
Capacity (GB) numeric 195 
Free Space 194.451 GB 
Free Space (GB) numeric 194.451 
FS block size 1 MB 
FS type VMFS 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Local1 
Managed Object Reference datastore-208 












Capacity 195 GB 
Capacity (GB) numeric 195 
Free Space 194.451 GB 
Free Space (GB) numeric 194.451 
FS block size 1 MB 
FS type VMFS 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>Local2 
Managed Object Reference datastore-220 










Current balance -1000 
Current failover level -1 
DRS disabled 
Effective cpu (in MHz) 2712 
Effective memory (in MB) 1306 
HA disabled 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin 
Managed Object Reference domain-c141 
Name Melvin 
Number of cpu cores 2 
Number of cpu threads 2 
Number of effective hosts 2 
Number of hosts 2 
Parent Thesis 
Status green 
Target DRS balance -1000 
Total cpu (in MHz) 4940 
Total memory (in bytes) 5361614848 
Type ClusterComputeResource 










Connection State connected 
Cpu core frequency (in MHz) 2537 
CPU overall usage 1224 
CPU Sockets 1 
Datacenter Thesis 
Hyperthreading False 
License expiration date 3/10/2011 2:08:27 AM 
License feature 1 Name vmotion 
License feature 2 Name esxHost 
License used units 1 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84 
Managed Object Reference host-205 
Manufacturer VMware, Inc. 
Memory overall usage 820 
Memory Size 2.497 GB 
Memory Size, GB 2.497 
Model VMware Virtual Platform 
Name 10.0.0.84 
Parent Melvin 
Power State poweredOn 
Processor cores 1 
Processor type Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU     P8700  @ 2.53GHz 
Processors 1 
Product VMware ESXi 4.0.0 build-171294 





Connection State connected 
Cpu core frequency (in MHz) 2403 
CPU overall usage 141 
CPU Sockets 1 
Datacenter Thesis 
Hyperthreading False 
License expiration date 2/26/2011 6:40:59 PM 
License feature 1 Name vmotion 
License feature 2 Name esxHost 
License used units 1 




Managed Object Reference host-217 
Manufacturer VMware, Inc. 
Memory overall usage 744 
Memory Size 2.497 GB 
Memory Size, GB 2.497 
Model VMware Virtual Platform 
Name 10.0.0.85 
Parent Melvin 
Power State poweredOn 
Processor cores 1 
Processor type Intel(R) Core(TM) i3 CPU       M 370  @ 2.40GHz 
Processors 1 
Product VMware ESXi 4.0.0 build-171294 









Cpu expandable True 
Cpu level normal 
Cpu limit 2712 
Cpu reservation 2712 
Cpu shares 4000 
LastModified Not set 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>Resources 
Managed Object Reference resgroup-143 
Memory expandable True 
Memory level normal 
Memory limit 1318 
Memory reservation 1318 















Active Adapters vmnic0 
Forget Transmits True 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Link discovery protocol cdp 
Link discovery protocol operation listen 
Load Balancing Route based on the source of the port ID 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vSwitch0 
MAC Address Changes True 
Name vSwitch0 
Network Failure Detection False 
Notify Switches True 
Number of ports 56 






Active Adapters vmnic0 
Forget Transmits True 
Host 10.0.0.85 
Link discovery protocol cdp 
Link discovery protocol operation listen 
Load Balancing Route based on the source of the port ID 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vSwitch0 
MAC Address Changes True 
Name vSwitch0 
Network Failure Detection False 
Notify Switches True 
Number of ports 56 













IP Hints ;vlan: 0, subnet: 10.0.0.8-10.0.0.15 
















IP Hints ;vlan: 0, subnet: 10.0.0.8-10.0.0.15 











IP Address 10.0.0.84 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmk0 
MAC Address 00:0c:29:54:2e:7f 
Name vmk0 







IP Address 10.0.0.86 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmk1 
MAC Address 00:50:56:75:c2:2d 
Name vmk1 












Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmk0 
MAC Address 00:0c:29:47:35:d3 
Name vmk0 







IP Address 10.0.0.87 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmk1 
MAC Address 00:50:56:7f:cd:88 
Name vmk1 







Name VM Network 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>VM Network 
Managed Object Reference network-124 















Name Management Network 
Active Adapters vmnic0 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Load Balancing Route based on the source of the port ID 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Management Network 
Name Management Network 










Name VM Network 
Host 10.0.0.85 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>VM Network 
Managed Object Reference network-124 














Name Management Network 
Active Adapters vmnic0 
Host 10.0.0.85 
Load Balancing Route based on the source of the port ID 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>Management Network 
Name Management Network 
Network Failure Detection False 









Alternate guest name FreeBSD (32-bit) 
Annotation Not set 
Boot delay 0 
Capability cpu feature mask supported True 
Capability is boot options supported True 
Capability is disabling snapshots supported False 




Capability is lock snapshots supported False 
Capability is memory snapshots supported True 
Capability is multiple snapshots supported True 
Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported True 
Capability is powered off snapshots supported True 
Capability is quiesced snapshots supported True 
Capability is record replay supported True 
Capability is revert to snapshot supported True 
Capability is s1Acpi management supported True 
Capability is setting display topology supported False 
Capability is setting screen resolution supported False 
Capability is setting video ram size supported True 
Capability is snapshot config supported True 
Capability is snapshot operations supported True 
Capability is swap placement supported True 
Capability is tools auto update supported False 
Capability is tools sync time supported True 
Capability is virtual mmu usage supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported True 
CD/DVD drive 1 label CD/DVD Drive 1 
CD/DVD drive 1 summary ISO [VSAN] ISOs/FreeBSD-7.3-RELEASE-i386-livefs.iso 
CDROM Mounted False 
Change Tracking Enabled False 
ChangeVersion 1/19/2011 8:53:29 PM 
Cluster Melvin 
Committed 1  8590277234 
Connection State connected 
CPU 1 
Cpu expandable False 
Cpu level normal 
Cpu limit Not set 
Cpu reservation Not set 
Cpu shares 1000 
Default power off operation type soft 
Default reset type soft 
Default suspend type hard 
Disable acceleration False 
Disk uuid enabled False 
Enable logging True 
Guest id Not set 
Guest OS FreeBSD (32-bit) 
Hardware virtualization for execution usage hvAuto 





Hostname Not set 
Hot plug memory increment size 0 
Hot plug memory limit 0 
Ht sharing any 
Instance UUID 526ffa43-7f9f-1027-735a-96b61e99b490 
Ip address Not set 
Is cpu hot add enabled False 
Is cpu hot remove enabled False 
Is question raised Not set 
Last modified 1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM 
List of datastore name and urls 
name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8-
000c29542e7f 
Location 564d73ca-ce99-3472-b49d-da4ee80d5904 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>FreeBSD 
Log directory [VSAN] FreeBSD/ 
Managed Object Reference vm-277 
Memory (MB) 256 
Memory expandable False 
Memory hot add enabled False 
Memory level normal 
Memory limit Not set 
Memory reservation Not set 
Memory shares 2560 
Monitor type release 
Name FreeBSD 
Network Adapter 1 Label Network adapter 1 
Network Adapter 1 MAC 00:50:56:ad:56:71 
Network Adapter 1 Summary VM Network 
Notes Not set 
NPIV desired node WWNs 0 
NPIV desired port Wwns 0 
NPIV is temporary disabled True 
NPIV node World Wide Name Not set 
NPIV on non rdm disks False 
NPIV port world wide name Not set 
NPIV world wide name type Not set 
Number of cpu 1 
Number of ethernet cards 1 
Number of virtual disks 1 
OverallStatus green 
Parent Not set 
Power off operation type preset 
Power State poweredOff 




Record replay state inactive 
Reset type preset 
Run with debug info False 
Runtime Info boot time Not set 
Runtime Info clean power off False 
Runtime Info fault tolerance state notConfigured 
Runtime info max cpu usage 1393 
Runtime info max memory usage 256 
Runtime Info memory overhead 114311168 
Runtime Info need secondary reason Not set 
Runtime Info number of active MKS connections 0 
SCSI bus sharing 1  noSharing 
SCSI controller 1  LSI Logic 
SCSI controller name 1  SCSI controller 0 
Snapshot directory [VSAN] FreeBSD/ 
Snapshot power off behavior powerOff 
Snapshot tree locked False 
Snapshots disabled False 
Standby action powerOnSuspend 
Suspend directory [VSAN] FreeBSD/ 
Suspend interval 0 
Suspend operation type preset 
Suspend time Not set 
Swap placement inherit 
Template False 
Tools installer mounted False 
Tools status guestToolsNotRunning 
Tools version status guestToolsNotInstalled 
Type VirtualMachine 
Uncommitted 1  268435456 
Unshared 1  8590277234 
Use TCP/IP Offloading False 
UUID 422d9e50-0500-44f6-8202-99643638e2bb 
Version vmx-07 
Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode persistent 
Virtual Disk 1 Is split No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is write through No 
Virtual Disk 1 Label Hard disk 1 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary 8388608 KB 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB 8 
Virtual MMU usage automatic 
Vm config file [VSAN] FreeBSD/FreeBSD.vmx 
VMCapability is change tracking supported True 




Vmdk File 1  [VSAN] FreeBSD/FreeBSD.vmdk 
VMTools after power on True 
VMTools after resume True 
VMTools before guest reboot False 
VMTools before guest shutdown True 
VMTools before guest standby True 
VMTools pending customization Not set 
VMTools sync time with host False 
VMTools tools version 0 
VMtools upgrade policy manual 
VMWare Tools tools not installed 
Vmx File [VSAN] FreeBSD/FreeBSD.vmx 
Vmx File Short FreeBSD.vmx 





Alternate guest name Not set 
Annotation 
Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games, 
ready to play! 
 
Now you can begin to waste your time once again. 
Boot delay 0 
Capability cpu feature mask supported True 
Capability is boot options supported True 
Capability is disabling snapshots supported False 
Capability is disk shares supported True 
Capability is lock snapshots supported False 
Capability is memory snapshots supported True 
Capability is multiple snapshots supported True 
Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported False 
Capability is powered off snapshots supported True 
Capability is quiesced snapshots supported True 
Capability is record replay supported True 
Capability is revert to snapshot supported True 
Capability is s1Acpi management supported True 
Capability is setting display topology supported False 
Capability is setting screen resolution supported False 
Capability is setting video ram size supported True 
Capability is snapshot config supported True 
Capability is snapshot operations supported True 
Capability is swap placement supported True 
Capability is tools auto update supported False 
Capability is tools sync time supported True 




Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported False 
Capability is vm npiv wwn supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported False 
CD/DVD drive 1 label CD/DVD Drive 1 
CD/DVD drive 1 summary ATAPI CDROM 0 
CDROM Mounted False 
Change Tracking Enabled False 
ChangeVersion 1/19/2011 8:53:40 PM 
Cluster Melvin 
Committed 1  107656118 
Connection State connected 
CPU 1 
Cpu expandable False 
Cpu level normal 
Cpu limit Not set 
Cpu reservation Not set 
Cpu shares 1000 
Default power off operation type soft 
Default reset type soft 
Default suspend type hard 
Disable acceleration False 
Disk uuid enabled False 
Enable logging True 
Guest id Not set 
Guest OS Other (32-bit) 
Hardware virtualization for execution usage hvAuto 
Has snapshot(s) No 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Hostname Not set 
Hot plug memory increment size 0 
Hot plug memory limit 0 
Ht sharing any 
Instance UUID 502d6bb1-0bfe-ceff-3531-d5432fcfb2a6 
Ip address Not set 
Is cpu hot add enabled False 
Is cpu hot remove enabled False 
Is question raised Not set 
Last modified 1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM 
List of datastore name and urls 
name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8-
000c29542e7f 
Location 564d69bb-f70f-2652-da91-30f661e6efca 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Nostalgia2 
Log directory [VSAN] Nostalgia2/ 
Managed Object Reference vm-294 




Memory expandable False 
Memory hot add enabled False 
Memory level normal 
Memory limit Not set 
Memory reservation Not set 
Memory shares 640 
Monitor type release 
Name Nostalgia2 
Network Adapter 1 Label Network adapter 1 
Network Adapter 1 MAC 00:50:56:ad:76:c8 
Network Adapter 1 Summary VM Network 
Notes 
Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games, 
ready to play! 
 
Now you can begin to waste your time once again. 
NPIV desired node WWNs 0 
NPIV desired port Wwns 0 
NPIV is temporary disabled False 
NPIV node World Wide Name Not set 
NPIV on non rdm disks False 
NPIV port world wide name Not set 
NPIV world wide name type Not set 
Number of cpu 1 
Number of ethernet cards 1 
Number of virtual disks 1 
OverallStatus green 
Parent Not set 
Power off operation type soft 
Power State poweredOff 
Record replay enabled False 
Record replay state inactive 
Reset type soft 
Run with debug info False 
Runtime Info boot time Not set 
Runtime Info clean power off False 
Runtime Info fault tolerance state notConfigured 
Runtime info max cpu usage 1393 
Runtime info max memory usage 64 
Runtime Info memory overhead 111149056 
Runtime Info need secondary reason Not set 
Runtime Info number of active MKS connections 0 
SCSI bus sharing 1  noSharing 
SCSI controller 1  BusLogic 
SCSI controller name 1  SCSI controller 0 




Snapshot power off behavior powerOff 
Snapshot tree locked False 
Snapshots disabled False 
Standby action checkpoint 
Suspend directory [VSAN] Nostalgia2/ 
Suspend interval 0 
Suspend operation type hard 
Suspend time Not set 
Swap placement inherit 
Template False 
Tools installer mounted False 
Tools status guestToolsNotRunning 
Tools version status guestToolsNotInstalled 
Type VirtualMachine 
Uncommitted 1  67108864 
Unshared 1  107656118 
Use TCP/IP Offloading False 
UUID 564d69bb-f70f-2652-da91-30f661e6efca 
Version vmx-04 
Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode persistent 
Virtual Disk 1 Is split No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is write through No 
Virtual Disk 1 Label Hard disk 1 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary 104858 KB 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB 0.1 
Virtual MMU usage automatic 
Vm config file [VSAN] Nostalgia2/Nostalgia.vmx 
VMCapability is change tracking supported False 
VMCapability is console preferences supported False 
Vmdk File 1  [VSAN] Nostalgia2/Nostalgia.vmdk 
VMTools after power on True 
VMTools after resume True 
VMTools before guest reboot False 
VMTools before guest shutdown True 
VMTools before guest standby True 
VMTools pending customization Not set 
VMTools sync time with host False 
VMTools tools version 0 
VMtools upgrade policy manual 
VMWare Tools tools not installed 
Vmx File [VSAN] Nostalgia2/Nostalgia.vmx 
Vmx File Short Nostalgia.vmx 







Alternate guest name Not set 
Annotation 
Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games, 
ready to play! 
 
Now you can begin to waste your time once again. 
Boot delay 0 
Capability cpu feature mask supported True 
Capability is boot options supported True 
Capability is disabling snapshots supported False 
Capability is disk shares supported True 
Capability is lock snapshots supported False 
Capability is memory snapshots supported True 
Capability is multiple snapshots supported True 
Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported False 
Capability is powered off snapshots supported True 
Capability is quiesced snapshots supported True 
Capability is record replay supported True 
Capability is revert to snapshot supported True 
Capability is s1Acpi management supported True 
Capability is setting display topology supported False 
Capability is setting screen resolution supported False 
Capability is setting video ram size supported True 
Capability is snapshot config supported True 
Capability is snapshot operations supported True 
Capability is swap placement supported True 
Capability is tools auto update supported False 
Capability is tools sync time supported True 
Capability is virtual mmu usage supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported False 
Capability is vm npiv wwn supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported False 
CD/DVD drive 1 label CD/DVD Drive 1 
CD/DVD drive 1 summary ATAPI CDROM 0 
CDROM Mounted False 
Change Tracking Enabled False 
ChangeVersion 1/19/2011 10:14:20 PM 
Cluster Melvin 
Committed 1  107618581 
Connection State connected 
CPU 1 
Cpu expandable False 
Cpu level normal 
Cpu limit Not set 




Cpu shares 1000 
Default power off operation type soft 
Default reset type soft 
Default suspend type hard 
Disable acceleration False 
Disk uuid enabled False 
Enable logging True 
Guest id Not set 
Guest OS Other (32-bit) 
Hardware virtualization for execution usage hvAuto 
Has snapshot(s) No 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Hostname Not set 
Hot plug memory increment size 0 
Hot plug memory limit 0 
Ht sharing any 
Instance UUID 526ed5f0-0059-c0ac-0de0-5695547d63b6 
Ip address Not set 
Is cpu hot add enabled False 
Is cpu hot remove enabled False 
Is question raised Not set 
Last modified 1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM 
List of datastore name and urls 
name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8-
000c29542e7f 
Location 564dc808-69cc-a534-400a-ed9edd1d93d0 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Nostalgia 
Log directory [VSAN] Nostalgia/ 
Managed Object Reference vm-303 
Memory (MB) 64 
Memory expandable False 
Memory hot add enabled False 
Memory level normal 
Memory limit Not set 
Memory reservation Not set 
Memory shares 640 
Monitor type release 
Name Nostalgia 
Network Adapter 1 Label Network adapter 1 
Network Adapter 1 MAC 00:50:56:ad:10:3c 
Network Adapter 1 Summary VM Network 
Notes 
Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games, 
ready to play! 
 
Now you can begin to waste your time once again. 
NPIV desired node WWNs 0 




NPIV is temporary disabled False 
NPIV node World Wide Name Not set 
NPIV on non rdm disks False 
NPIV port world wide name Not set 
NPIV world wide name type Not set 
Number of cpu 1 
Number of ethernet cards 1 
Number of virtual disks 1 
OverallStatus green 
Parent Not set 
Power off operation type soft 
Power State poweredOff 
Record replay enabled False 
Record replay state inactive 
Reset type soft 
Run with debug info False 
Runtime Info boot time Not set 
Runtime Info clean power off False 
Runtime Info fault tolerance state notConfigured 
Runtime info max cpu usage 1319 
Runtime info max memory usage 64 
Runtime Info memory overhead 111149056 
Runtime Info need secondary reason Not set 
Runtime Info number of active MKS connections 0 
SCSI bus sharing 1  noSharing 
SCSI controller 1  BusLogic 
SCSI controller name 1  SCSI controller 0 
Snapshot directory [VSAN] Nostalgia/ 
Snapshot power off behavior powerOff 
Snapshot tree locked False 
Snapshots disabled False 
Standby action checkpoint 
Suspend directory [VSAN] Nostalgia/ 
Suspend interval 0 
Suspend operation type hard 
Suspend time Not set 
Swap placement inherit 
Template False 
Tools installer mounted False 
Tools status guestToolsNotRunning 
Tools version status guestToolsNotInstalled 
Type VirtualMachine 
Uncommitted 1  67108864 
Unshared 1  107618581 






Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode persistent 
Virtual Disk 1 Is split No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is write through No 
Virtual Disk 1 Label Hard disk 1 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary 104858 KB 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB 0.1 
Virtual MMU usage automatic 
Vm config file [VSAN] Nostalgia/Nostalgia.vmx 
VMCapability is change tracking supported False 
VMCapability is console preferences supported False 
Vmdk File 1  [VSAN] Nostalgia/Nostalgia.vmdk 
VMTools after power on True 
VMTools after resume True 
VMTools before guest reboot False 
VMTools before guest shutdown True 
VMTools before guest standby True 
VMTools pending customization Not set 
VMTools sync time with host False 
VMTools tools version 0 
VMtools upgrade policy manual 
VMWare Tools tools not installed 
Vmx File [VSAN] Nostalgia/Nostalgia.vmx 
Vmx File Short Nostalgia.vmx 





Alternate guest name Not set 
Annotation Not set 
Boot delay 0 
Capability cpu feature mask supported True 
Capability is boot options supported True 
Capability is disabling snapshots supported False 
Capability is disk shares supported True 
Capability is lock snapshots supported False 
Capability is memory snapshots supported True 
Capability is multiple snapshots supported True 
Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported True 
Capability is powered off snapshots supported True 
Capability is quiesced snapshots supported True 




Capability is revert to snapshot supported True 
Capability is s1Acpi management supported True 
Capability is setting display topology supported False 
Capability is setting screen resolution supported False 
Capability is setting video ram size supported True 
Capability is snapshot config supported True 
Capability is snapshot operations supported True 
Capability is swap placement supported True 
Capability is tools auto update supported False 
Capability is tools sync time supported True 
Capability is virtual mmu usage supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported True 
CD/DVD drive 1 label CD/DVD Drive 1 
CD/DVD drive 1 summary ATAPI ide0:0 
CDROM Mounted False 
Change Tracking Enabled False 
ChangeVersion 1/19/2011 8:42:43 AM 
Cluster Melvin 
Committed 1  1073801554 
Connection State connected 
CPU 1 
Cpu expandable False 
Cpu level normal 
Cpu limit Not set 
Cpu reservation Not set 
Cpu shares 1000 
Default power off operation type soft 
Default reset type soft 
Default suspend type hard 
Disable acceleration False 
Disk uuid enabled False 
Enable logging True 
Eula Not set 
Guest id other26xLinuxGuest 
Guest OS Ubuntu Linux (32-bit) 
Hardware virtualization for execution usage hvAuto 
Has snapshot(s) No 
Host 10.0.0.85 
Hostname ubuntu.local 
Hot plug memory increment size 0 
Hot plug memory limit 0 





Instance UUID 52eb61eb-9f96-4dcd-6c32-348d33aa2a84 
Ip address 10.0.0.22 
IpAllocationPolicy fixedPolicy 
IpProtocol IPv4 
Is cpu hot add enabled False 
Is cpu hot remove enabled False 
Is question raised Not set 
Last modified 1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM 
List of datastore name and urls 
name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8-
000c29542e7f 
Location 564d8a44-8d32-f1f5-2209-e4eb5c3ddfdf 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>LLSP 
Log directory [VSAN] LLSP/ 
Managed Object Reference vm-404 
Memory (MB) 512 
Memory expandable False 
Memory hot add enabled False 
Memory level normal 
Memory limit Not set 
Memory reservation Not set 
Memory shares 5120 
Monitor type release 
Name LLSP 
Network Adapter 1 IP 10.0.0.22 
Network Adapter 1 Label Network adapter 1 
Network Adapter 1 MAC 00:50:56:ad:01:6c 
Network Adapter 1 Summary VM Network 
Notes Not set 
NPIV desired node WWNs 0 
NPIV desired port Wwns 0 
NPIV is temporary disabled True 
NPIV node World Wide Name Not set 
NPIV on non rdm disks False 
NPIV port world wide name Not set 
NPIV world wide name type Not set 
Number of cpu 1 
Number of ethernet cards 1 
Number of virtual disks 1 
OverallStatus green 
OvfEnvironmentTransport Not set 
Parent Not set 
Power off operation type soft 
Power State poweredOff 
Record replay enabled False 




Reset type soft 
Run with debug info False 
Runtime Info boot time Not set 
Runtime Info clean power off False 
Runtime Info fault tolerance state notConfigured 
Runtime info max cpu usage 1319 
Runtime info max memory usage 512 
Runtime Info memory overhead 118517760 
Runtime Info need secondary reason Not set 
Runtime Info number of active MKS connections 0 
SCSI bus sharing 1  noSharing 
SCSI controller 1  LSI Logic 
SCSI controller name 1  SCSI controller 0 
Snapshot directory [VSAN] LLSP/ 
Snapshot power off behavior powerOff 
Snapshot tree locked False 
Snapshots disabled False 
Standby action checkpoint 
SupportedAllocationScheme Not set 
SupportedIpProtocol IPv4 
Suspend directory [VSAN] LLSP/ 
Suspend interval 0 
Suspend operation type hard 
Suspend time Not set 
Swap placement inherit 
Template False 
Tools installer mounted False 
Tools status guestToolsNotRunning 
Tools version status guestToolsCurrent 
Type VirtualMachine 
Uncommitted 1  536870912 
Unshared 1  1073801554 
Use TCP/IP Offloading False 
UUID 422d2e0c-2fd5-ad39-1836-e18ce991bcc2 
Version vmx-07 
Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode persistent 
Virtual Disk 1 Is split No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is write through No 
Virtual Disk 1 Label Hard disk 1 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary 1048576 KB 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB 1 
Virtual MMU usage automatic 
Vm config file [VSAN] LLSP/LLSP.vmx 




VMCapability is console preferences supported False 
Vmdk File 1  [VSAN] LLSP/LLSP.vmdk 
VMTools after power on True 
VMTools after resume True 
VMTools before guest reboot False 
VMTools before guest shutdown True 
VMTools before guest standby True 
VMTools pending customization Not set 
VMTools sync time with host False 
VMTools tools version 8322 
VMtools upgrade policy manual 
VMWare Tools not running 
Vmx File [VSAN] LLSP/LLSP.vmx 
Vmx File Short LLSP.vmx 





Alternate guest name Other (32-bit) 
Annotation Not set 
Boot delay 0 
Capability cpu feature mask supported True 
Capability is boot options supported True 
Capability is disabling snapshots supported False 
Capability is disk shares supported True 
Capability is lock snapshots supported False 
Capability is memory snapshots supported True 
Capability is multiple snapshots supported True 
Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported True 
Capability is powered off snapshots supported True 
Capability is quiesced snapshots supported True 
Capability is record replay supported True 
Capability is revert to snapshot supported True 
Capability is s1Acpi management supported True 
Capability is setting display topology supported False 
Capability is setting screen resolution supported False 
Capability is setting video ram size supported True 
Capability is snapshot config supported True 
Capability is snapshot operations supported True 
Capability is swap placement supported True 
Capability is tools auto update supported False 
Capability is tools sync time supported True 
Capability is virtual mmu usage supported True 




Capability is vm npiv wwn supported True 
Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported True 
CD/DVD drive 1 label CD/DVD Drive 1 
CD/DVD drive 1 summary ISO [VSAN] ISOs/dsl-4.4.10.iso 
CDROM Mounted True 
Change Tracking Enabled False 
ChangeVersion 1/20/2011 10:08:15 AM 
Cluster Melvin 
Committed 1  16374876340 
Connection State connected 
CPU 1 
Cpu expandable False 
Cpu level normal 
Cpu limit Not set 
Cpu reservation Not set 
Cpu shares 1000 
Default power off operation type soft 
Default reset type soft 
Default suspend type hard 
Disable acceleration False 
Disk uuid enabled False 
Enable logging True 
Guest id Not set 
Guest OS Other (32-bit) 
Hardware virtualization for execution usage hvAuto 
Has snapshot(s) No 
Host 10.0.0.84 
Hostname Not set 
Hot plug memory increment size 0 
Hot plug memory limit 256 
Ht sharing any 
Instance UUID 528a2ef3-5113-c216-74c3-98a86e65cf3b 
Ip address Not set 
Is cpu hot add enabled False 
Is cpu hot remove enabled False 
Is question raised Not set 
Last modified 1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM 
List of datastore name and urls 
name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8-
000c29542e7f 
Location 564d2765-23c1-35cb-0889-f9a6f2c2a6ff 
Location Path >10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>DSL 
Log directory [VSAN] DSL/ 
Managed Object Reference vm-410 
Memory (MB) 256 




Memory hot add enabled False 
Memory level normal 
Memory limit Not set 
Memory reservation Not set 
Memory shares 2560 
Monitor type release 
Name DSL 
Network Adapter 1 Label Network adapter 1 
Network Adapter 1 MAC 00:50:56:ad:61:c2 
Network Adapter 1 Summary VM Network 
Notes Not set 
NPIV desired node WWNs 0 
NPIV desired port Wwns 0 
NPIV is temporary disabled True 
NPIV node World Wide Name Not set 
NPIV on non rdm disks False 
NPIV port world wide name Not set 
NPIV world wide name type Not set 
Number of cpu 1 
Number of ethernet cards 1 
Number of virtual disks 1 
OverallStatus green 
Parent Not set 
Power off operation type preset 
Power State poweredOn 
Record replay enabled False 
Record replay state inactive 
Reset type preset 
Run with debug info False 
Runtime Info boot time Not set 
Runtime Info clean power off False 
Runtime Info fault tolerance state notConfigured 
Runtime info max cpu usage 1393 
Runtime info max memory usage 256 
Runtime Info memory overhead 75235328 
Runtime Info need secondary reason Not set 
Runtime Info number of active MKS connections 1 
SCSI bus sharing 1  noSharing 
SCSI controller 1  LSI Logic 
SCSI controller name 1  SCSI controller 0 
Snapshot directory [VSAN] DSL/ 
Snapshot power off behavior powerOff 
Snapshot tree locked False 
Snapshots disabled False 




Suspend directory [VSAN] DSL/ 
Suspend interval 0 
Suspend operation type preset 
Suspend time Not set 
Swap placement inherit 
Template False 
Tools installer mounted False 
Tools status guestToolsNotRunning 
Tools version status Not set 
Type VirtualMachine 
Uncommitted 1  0 
Unshared 1  16374876340 
Use TCP/IP Offloading False 
UUID 422dd6a1-38e8-1594-c77c-fd4fc5eed7e9 
Version vmx-07 
Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode persistent 
Virtual Disk 1 Is split No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned No 
Virtual Disk 1 Is write through No 
Virtual Disk 1 Label Hard disk 1 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary 15728640 KB 
Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB 15 
Virtual MMU usage automatic 
Vm config file [VSAN] DSL/DSL.vmx 
VMCapability is change tracking supported True 
VMCapability is console preferences supported False 
Vmdk File 1  [VSAN] DSL/DSL.vmdk 
VMTools after power on True 
VMTools after resume True 
VMTools before guest reboot False 
VMTools before guest shutdown True 
VMTools before guest standby True 
VMTools pending customization Not set 
VMTools sync time with host False 
VMTools tools version 0 
VMtools upgrade policy manual 
VMWare Tools tools not installed 
Vmx File [VSAN] DSL/DSL.vmx 
Vmx File Short DSL.vmx 
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